NOTES
NEW CIVIL LIABILITIES UNDER SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE ACT RULES
Most courts have held that a director, although a fiduciary of the corporation, owes no fiduciary duty to its shareholders personally, and may deal with
them at arm's length in the purchase of their shares.' Only in a minority of
jurisdictions is a duty of disclosure and fair dealing placed upon directors in
such transactions.2 Federal securities legislation has contributed to the extension and enforcement of fiduciary duties in several ways,3 but until recently
insiders buying unlisted securities were able to use their inside information to
the detriment of the shareholders from whom they purchased, so long as their
conduct did not involve a breach of the limited fiduciary obligations imposed by
state courts.
In an attempt to cope with this and other deceptive practices, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, in 1942, adopted Rule X-xoB- 5,4 under Section
io(b)s of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. This section prohibits
"manipulative or deceptive" devices employed in connection with the purchase
and sale of securities and in contravention of the rules and regulations of the
SEC. Rule X-ioB-5, defining such manipulative or deceptive devices, makes it
unlawful:
.... for any person directly or indirectly
(i) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact, or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
xBerle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 224, 225 (1932); Ballantine, Corporations 212 (1946).
'Ballantine, Corporations 213 (1946).
3 Section 16(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides that a director's
profits from the purchase and resale within six months of his corporation's listed shares may be
captured by the corporation. 48 Stat. 896 (x934), i5 U.S.C.A. § 78p (1941). See Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F. 2d 231 (C.C.A. 2d, i943), cert. den. 320 U.S. 751 (1943). Withholding

of material facts in the sale-but not the purchase-of both listed and unlisted securities
has been made unlawful by Section X7(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. 48 Stat. 84 (1934),
15 U.S.C.A. § 77q (i94i). And manipulative practices by brokers and dealers are prohibited
by Section r5(c) i of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 48 Stat. 895 (i934), amended
49 Stat. 1377 (1936), 15 U.S.C.A. § 780 (1941).
4 General Rules and Regulations under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (1946).
s 48 Stat. 891 (ig34), iS U.S.C.A. § 78j (194i).
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(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Violations of this rule have constituted the basis of a number of injunctive
actions by the SEC, most of which have terminated in consent decrees. 6 Moreover, a new and more effective remedy will become available to shareholders
injured by insiders who violate the rule if four recent federal district court
decisions are upheld. It was decided in each of the cases that a violation of Rule
X-ioB-5 creates a civil cause of action in the injured shareholder against the
violator.
In the-principal case, Kardon v. National Gypsum Company,7 the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant directors induced them to sell their shares to the
directors without disclosing that negotiations were pending with the National
Gypsum Company for the sale of some of the corporate assets and for contracts
governing future business relations between them. It was also alleged that the
National Gypsum Company was a party to this scheme, and that since the
mails and other instruments of interstate commerce were used, this conduct was
a violation of Section xo(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and of
Rule X-IoB-5. The plaintiffs sought damages for the injury resulting from the
statutory violation, or, alternatively, an accounting under Section 29 (b) of the
act. 8 The court, denying a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over the defendants, who were served with process in NewYork and Michigan respectively,
held that a private cause of action for damages exists as a result of the violation
of Section io(b). Consequently it held that the jurisdiction of the court was
properly invoked under Section 27 of the act,9 which authorizes service of
process anywhere in the United States in suits "to enforce any liability or duty
created by this title or rules and regulations thereunder."
The other three cases also involved private actions for violation of Rule
X-IoB-5. In the first case, the court, relying on the decision in the Kardon case,
also denied a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and upheld civil liability for violation of the rule.o An oral decision in the second case-a shareholder
6Tenth Annual Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission 82 (1945); see Purcell,
Foster, and Hill, Enforcing the Accountability of Corporate Management and Related Activities of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 32 Va. L. Rev. 497, 551-54 (1946).
769 F. Supp. 512 (Pa., 1946).
'48 Stat. 903 (934) , amended 52 Stat. 1076 (1938), x5 U.S.C.A. §78cc (1941).
948 Stat. 902 (i934), amended 49 Stat. 921 (1936), iS U.S.C.A. § 78aa (1941).

10The court's decision took the form of a letter to counsel. Fifth-Third Union Trust Co. v.
Block, Civil Action No. 1507 (S.D. Ohio, i94 6). The plaintiff had alleged that the defendantsdirectors and officers of the corporation of which the plaintiff's mentally incompetent ward was
a shareholder-induced the ward to believe that the shares were worth far less than their
actual value, purchased his shares through a broker without disclosing their identity, and
resold them a week later for seven times as much as they paid for them. Relying on the decision
in the Kardon case, the court denied a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and thus
upheld a private cause of action for damages for breach of Section io(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934.
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derivative suit-denied a similar motion to dismiss," and in the third case the
court not only upheld the liability of directors for a breach of the fiduciary
standards of Rule X-IoB-5 but also extended liability to the brokers involved.! 2
Although the complaint in each of the cases spells out what amounts to a common law action for fraud and deceit, the comparative ease of proving a material
non-disclosure, the uncertainty of relief in the state courts, and the broad federal
jurisdiction over multiple out-of-state defendants, make the federal statutory
cause of action much more attractive. But whether a federal court can assume
jurisdiction depends in turn upon whether a private cause of action exists for a
violation of the federal statute.
The court in the Kardon case stated that a private cause of action for violation of the rule was created in two ways: first, through the common law-rule of
civil liability for violation of a statutory duty designed to protect the class of
persons to which the plaintiff belongs; second, under Section 29 (b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 3 which provides that contracts in violation of any section of the act shall be void.
In upholding common law liability for breach of a statutory duty, the court,
applying conventional tort doctrines, declared that "the disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a tort,"14 and quoted from the Restatement of Torts"s in support of the doctrine that one who violates a statutory
duty and thereby brings about the harm which the statute was designed to prevent becomes liable to a member of the class of persons whom the statute was
intended to protect.'" Statutory liability of this nature has most often been invoked in personal injury cases, and it is usually said that violation of a statutory duty is negligence per se.' 7 But holding that the violation of a statute is
negligence per se is equivalent to creating a direct civil liability based solely
upon the violation of the statute.' 8 Moreover, there are a number of cases in
which liability of this nature has been imposed for injuries to property rights
rather than to personal rights.9 Indeed, in several cases where an action based
upon negligence would have been unsuccessful it has been held that the viola"Slavin v. Germantown Fire Insurance Co., Civil Action No. 6564 (E.D. Pa.,
Fry v. Schumaker, C.C.H. Sec. Act. Serv. 9o366 ('947).

1946).

12

'3

48 Stat. 9o3 (1934), amended 52 Stat. 1076 (1938), i5U.S.C.A. § 78cc (i94i).
v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (Pa., 1946).

'4 Kardon

is
2 Rest., Torts § 286 (1934).
,6 Prosser, Torts § 39 (1941); Harper, Torts § 78 (I933).
17 Ibid.; see also Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, i6 Minn.L.
Rev. 361 (1932); The Effect of Penal Statutes on Civil Liability, 32 Col. L. Rev. 712 (1932).
8
Loades, op. cit. supra note 17.

19Abounader v. Strohmeyer & Arpe Co., 243 N.Y. 458, 154 N.E. 309 (1926); P. G. Farm
v. Newton By-Products Mfg. Co., 248 N.Y. 293, 162 N.E. 84 (1928); Tarrance v. Chapman,
196 Ala. 88, 71 So. 707 (1916); Mazzetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913);

cf. Steckler v. Pennroad Corp., 136 F. 2d 197 (C.C.A. 3d, 1943).
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tion of a statute in itself constitutes a basis for civil liability.2 In the Kardon
case the conduct complained of was in violation of Section io(b) of the statute
and the shareholder plaintiff was a member of the class (investors) which Section io(b) of the statute is designed to protect. Unless a contrary intention of
Congress is manifest, it would appear that the alleged breach created in the
injured party a private cause of action.
Such a contrary intention has been found in the fact that Congress expressly
created civil liability for violations of three other sections of the act. It has been
argued that if Congress had also intended that civil liability should be a consequence of a violation of this section it would have so provided. The court in
the Kardon case, in rejecting the applicability of the maxim, expressio unius est
exclusio alterims, which epitomizes such an argument, asserted that in view of
the general purpose of the act, the mere omission of an express provision for civil
liability is not sufficient to negative a liability which normally, by virtue of
the basic principles of tort law, results from the doing of the prohibited act. This
assertion is supported by a number of cases which have severely limited the applicability of the maxim. 2 Moreover, the view that Congress did not intend to
deny a private right of action for a violation of Section io(b) when it expressly
provided for a civil cause of action in other sections is substantiated by an examination of Sections 9(e), 2 3 16(b)24 and 18(a)25--the three sections which expressly
provide for private causes of action. These sections deal with special matters;
they provide for less restricted recovery than would be possible at common law;
they prescribe special rules as to the burden of proof and a shorter statute of
limitations. 6 When these provisions are viewed in the light of the broad purposes of the statute and the large area in which it was intended that protection
20In Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (ig96), the Supreme Court said,
"A disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in damage to
one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover damages
from the party in default is implied ..... "See also Narramore v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry.
Co., 96 Fed. 298 (C.C.A. 6th, x899); Zaskowski v. American Steel & Wire Co., 258 Fed. 9
(C.C.A. 6th, 1918); Donaldson v. Tuscon Gas, Electric Light & Power Co., 14 F. Supp. 246
(Ariz., 1935); Armour v. Wanamaker, 202 Fed. 423 (C.C.A. 3d, 1913); Annis v. Britton, 232
Mich. 291, 2o5 N.W. 128 (1925); Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 107 Minn. 104,
119 N.W. 428 (1909); Ives v. Welden, 114 Iowa 476, 87 N.W. 408 (19oi).
" SEC Action against Fraudulent Purchasers of Securities, 59Harv. L. Rev. 769,779 (1946);
see SEC v. Long Island Lighting Co., 148 F. 2d 252 (C.C.A. 2d, 1945).
"United States v. Barnes, 222 U.S. 513 (1912); Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (1928); Neuberger v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 311 U.S. 83 (1940);
SEC v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943); Bland v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 102 F. 2d 157
(C.C.A. 7 th, 1939), cert. den. 308 U.S. 563 (1939); New York v. Davis, 7 F. 2d 566, 575
(C.C.A. 2d, 1925); Collins v. Russell, I14 F. 2d 334, 337 (C.C.A. 8th, i94o).
2348 Stat. 890 (i934), iS U.S.C.A. § 78i (1941).
24 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78p (1941).
25 48 Stat. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C.A. § 78r (941).
'6 See dissenting opinion of Judge Clark in Baird v. Franklin, 141 F. 2d 238, 245 (C.C.A.
2d, 1944).
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be made "reasonably complete and effective,' ' it becomes clear that reference
to special civil actions in some sections was not intended to exclude a private
cause of action in others. Added support for this view is to be found in Section
28(a) of the act, which says, "The rights and remedies provided by this title
shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may exist at
law or in equity.. ... 12
Direct authority for upholding civil liability for a breach of a duty created
by a section of the Securities and Exchange Act may be found in Baird v.
Franklin29a case in which investors brought an action against the New York
Stock Exchange, claiming that a failure of the Exchange to enforce its rules constituted a violation of Section 6(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act. 30 The
entire court agreed that a private cause of action could be maintained for the
violation of Section 6(b) of the act, although the majority found that the plaintiffs had failed to sustain the burden of proving damages.3' As in the Kardon
3
case, the jurisdiction of the court was upheld under Section 27 of the act. 2
Apart from the common law remedy for the breach of a statutory duty, the
court in the Kardoncase found another remedy, for the alleged violation of Section io(b), under Section 29 (b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 33 which provides that contracts in violation of any provision of the act shall be void. The
court ruled that "a statutory enactment that a contract of a certain kind shall
be void almost necessarily implies a remedy in respect to it,"34 and pointed out
that the 1938 amendment to this section clearly indicates that Congress intended the original statute to be interpreted as providing for suits by private
17

parties.3S

In 1938 Section 29 (b) was amended 6 by adding a proviso prescribing the
same statute of limitation for an action brought under Section 29 (b) for violation of Section x537 as for an action brought directly under Section 9(e),31 which
27 See statement of the necessity for regulation in Section 2 of the Securities and Ex change Act of 1934. 48 Stat. 88i (1934), i U.S.C.A. § 78b (1941).
2848 Stat. 9o3 (934), i5 U.S.C.A. § 78bb (194I).
29 41 F. 2d 238

(C.C.A. 2d, x944).

3' Baird v. Franklin, i F. 2d 238,

30 48 Stat. 886 (1934), iz U.S.C.A. § 78f (i94).
(C.C.A. 2d, I944).
Stat. 921 (1936), i5 U.S.C.A. § 78aa (1941). The Su239

3248 Stat. 9o2 (1934), amended 49
preme Court in Deckert v. Independent Shares Corp., 3'1 U.S. 282 (i94o), upheld the jurisdiction of the district court under the almost identical provisions of Section 22 of the Securities
Act of 1933. The question of jurisdiction in that case also depended only upon whether there
was a violation of a duty created by any section of the act.

3348 Stat. 9o3 (1934), amended 52 Stat. 1076 (1938), i5 U.S.C.A. § 78cc (1941).
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 514 (Pa., 1946).
court relied on Geismer v. Bond and Goodwin, 4o F. Supp. 876, 878 (N.Y., 1941);
see Oppenheimer v. F. J. Young & Co., 144 F. :2d 387 (C.C.A. 2d, 1944).
34

3s The

3 52

Stat. 1076 (1938).

37 48 Stat. 895 (1934), amended 49 Stat. 1377 (1936), i 5 U.S.C.A. § 780 (194I).

38 48 Stat. 890 (1934), i5 U.S.C.A. § 7 8i (1941).
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also makes unlawful certain manipulative practices of brokers and dealers. The
amendment thus confirms the view that the original Section 29(b) provided for
a cause of action for violations of other sections of the act where a contract was
involved. This interpretation was upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Goldstein v. Groesbeck,39 a case arising under the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act. The court, after declaring the contract void under Section
26(b),4o held that the plaintiff was entitled to a remedy in damages, saying,
"....
§ 26 is incomplete if not ineffective, unless it is considered to authorize
recovery ..... A useful analogy in favor of this interpretation may be found in
§ 29 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 which is virtually identical with
§ 26 of the Utility Act, for it is now clear from the 1938 amendment to § 29 that
Congress intended a right of recovery thereunder."4'
Thus the precedents seem to support the decision in the Kardoncase granting
a remedy for an injury sustained as a result of conduct in violation of Section
io(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, both under the common law rule
creating civil liability for breach of a statutory duty and under Section 29 (b)
of the act. 2
(C.C.A. 2d, x944), cert. den. 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
Stat. 836 (f935), i5 U.S.C.A. § 79z (1941)-

39 142 F. 2d422
40 49

Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F. 2d 422, 426-27 (C.C.A. 2d, '944).
recent opinion of the Delaware district court in Downing v. Howard, 68 F. Supp. 6
(Del., 1946), however, contains statements which conflict with those of the Kardon case. The
court distinguished Goldstein v. Groesbeck and dismissed the complaint of a plaintiff in a
derivative suit who sought an accounting under Section 26 of the Holding Company Act, or,
alternatively, damages for violation of Section 4 of that act. It was alleged that the corporation suffered damages to an amount in excess of $xoo,ooo,ooo because of depreciation in the
value of the securities held by the corporation resulting from manipulations by the directors
during a period in which it failed to register under the Public Utility Holding Company Act.
The court, sustaining a motion to dismiss, held that since no cause of action was stated under
the act, federal jurisdiction could not be invoked. The court argued, first, that the damages
could not be said to be a result of a failure to register, because the conduct of the directors
would have been legal if the corporation had registered; second, that because there were no
on
. _ n_-cof
illegal contracts involved, thelaintTcquldu"ainta n_
the act; third, that since there was no express provision in Section 4 of the act for civil liability,
whereas civil liability was expressly provided in other sections, the plaintiff could not recover
in a private cause of action; and fourth, that Section 4 is regulatory and only penal liabilities
ensue from a violation of that section.
The decision hinged on the issue of damages. If the alleged damages were not the result of
the statutory violation then neither of the alternative claims stated a valid cause of action.
On the other hand the facts of the case do not completely reject the possibility that the
securities would not have declined in value if the corporation had registered and had become
subject to the regulation of the SEC. Had the plaintiffs alleged specific acts of the directors
which damaged the corporation and which would have been subject to the regulation of the
SEC if the corporation had registered, it is possible that their complaint might have been
sustained. Although the corporation may not have entered into any contracts in violation of
Section 4 (a) (2), as the corporation did in the Goldstein case, its holding and voting of securities in subsidiaries was in violation of Section 4 (a) (6). If the plaintiffs could have shown that
this conduct would have been prevented by regulation of the SEC, they would have been
entitled to relief under the common law rule creating civil liability for the breach of a statutory
duty. Although the expressions in the opinion in respect to the maxim expressio unius est
4'

42 The
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The cases suggest that the remedies of shareholders may be extended in other
similar transactions which involve violations of the rules and regulations of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. One such extension of civil liability
under Rule X-1oB- 5 is the application of the rule to transactions between directors and the corporation rather than between directors and shareholders.43 Although a director already owes a duty of fair dealing and disclosure to the
corporation, a federal statutory remedy for shareholders might prove more effective than an attempt to enforce that duty in the state courts, especially since
the SEC as a potential amicus curiae can command much greater legal resources
than the average shareholder. Thus a shareholder's derivative suit might be
entertained under Rule X-IoB-5 against a director or a promoter who obtained
shares from the corporation for an inadequate consideration and without disclosure.
Similarly, a duty of disclosure has already been placed on directors in buying
shares for the corporation. The leading case of this type under Rule X-ioB-5
has been the Ward La France Truck Corporationcase, 44 in which shares were
purchased for the corporation at $3 to $6 per share when secret negotiations
were pending to sell the controlling shares for $45 per share and to liquidate at a
figure which would give the shareholders $25 per share. The situation was corrected without litigation and the shareholders recompensed after the SEC had
stated that the purchase of the securities under these circumstances without
disclosure constituted a violation of Rule X-ioB- 5 . The increasing number of
transactions in which shares are purchased for the corporation where the insiders have secret information indicating that their value is greater than the
market price has led the SEC to report that "the need for more drastic action to
prevent violations of this type is becoming increasingly apparent."45 A shareholder class suit in the federal courts under Rule X-ioB-5, possibly with the
aid of the SEC in notifying the parties, might prove an effective remedy for
6
shareholders who sell under these circumstances.4
exclusio aeriasare dicta, if it had been held that the damages were caused by a violation
of the statute the application of the maxim would have been an obstacle to recovery by the plaintiffs. Similarly the contention that Section 4 is a regulatory provision is also dictum, although
that contention, too, might become important if the issue of damages had been resolved differently. But a closer examination of the Holding Company Act would reveal that Congress did
not intend to deny civil liability for violation of Section 4, either when it expressly provided
civil liability for violation of other sections or when it provided other penalties for failure to
register under the act.
43See Slavin v. Germantown Fire Insurance Co., Civil Action No. 6564 (E.D. Pa., z946).
44 Matter of Purchase and Retirement of Ward La France Truck Corp. Class "A" and Class
"B" Stocks, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3445 (i943).
45 Tenth Annual Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission 82 (1945). See SEC
Action against Fraudulent Purchasers of Securities, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 769 (1946).
46 The purchase by a corporation of its own preferred shares when dividends are in arrears
is a special case of the type under discussion. Since unpaid cumulative dividends tend to
depress the market for preferred shares, the directors of the issuing corporation, allied pri-
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Civil liability might also be extended to promotors, brokers, and dealers. The
SEC has prosecuted a large number of criminal actions against such insiders for
various types of fraudulent schemes.47 In such situations there usually is a civil
remedy available to the defrauded investor in the state courts. The cause of action in the federal courts, however, might prove more effective here for the same
reasons which make it more attractive in other actions for violation of a federal
statutory fiduciary duty. Thus, relief may be provided for shareholders defrauded by "Ponzi" schemes,48 bucket shops,49 false investment advice, market
manipulations, and other broker-dealer violations of various provisions of the
federal securities acts.-" In fact each section of the several federal securities
acts in which certain conduct is made unlawful, and in which no exclusive
remedy is provided, might become the basis of civil actions of the type under
discussion, provided the, section is designed for the protection of investors.
It is possible, however, that the federal courts may be reluctant to uphold the
commission's broad quasi-legislative powers. They may set aside as being
beyond the Congressional grant of authorityS' rules which the SEC may promulgate. Further, courts may be reluctant to allow personal recovery of large
sums against corporate directors and officers or to impose burdensome or uncertain duties of disclosure upon them. The courts may adopt measures of damages
which will tend to discourage such actions.52 Finally, the general political trend
may reduce the effectiveness of government regulation of manipulative pracmarily with the common stockholders, find corporate purchase of the preferred stock under
these circumstances attractive, particularly if the prospects of a more prosperous future suggest that dividends will be available to the common if the preferred arrearages can be eliminated. If there has been an actual misrepresentation or a significant lack of disclosure in the
purchase of the corporation's shares, the directors might become liable, under Rule X-ioB-s
and the decision in the Kardon case upholding civil liability for its violation, to the shareholders from whom they purchased the shares. See Purchase by a Corporation of Its Own
Preferred Shares with Dividends in Arrears, 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 66 (1947).
47 "Most of the cases developed by the Commission involve fraud in the sale of securities.
These are prosecuted for the most part under Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 .....
In the last few years there has been a distinct increase in prosecutions under the Securities and
Exchange Act, particularly Sections io(b) and 15(c)." Tenth Annual Report of the Securities
and Exchange Commission i89-9o (i945).
48The name "Ponzi" is given to a scheme in which the investor is induced to buy additional
shares by the payment of dividends out of capital on shares he already holds. Tenth Annual
Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission i9o (1945).
49 This scheme consists of pretending to purchase securities for a customer and deliberately
failing to acquire them. If the price drops the security is purchased and delivered to the customer at the initial price. If the price rises he is persuaded to sell out and invest in another
security. The process is continued until the customer's funds are depleted. Tenth Annual Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission 192 (1945).
50 Ibid., i9o-96.

s1SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 8o (1943); see Stock Purchases by Directors during
Voluntary Reorganization, io Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 70-73 (1942); 14 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 75
(1946), noting Chenery Corp. v. SEC, 154 F. 2d 6 (App. D.C., i945).

s2 See

2

Bonbright, The Valuation of Property 8o8 (1937).
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tices in the purchase and sale of securities. It is possible, therefore, that civil
liability will be recognized in only the most flagrant situations, such as in the
Kardon case, and further extensions of this type of investor protection will have
to await another period like the one that brought about the original federal
securities legislation.

JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL
AFFAIRS OF LABOR UNIONS
In a recent Illinois case a member of a labor union appealed to the courts for
the redress of a grievance against the organization., This litigation again illustrates the need for a forum appropriate for the consideration of intra-union
disputes in an industrial society where more and more workers are abandoning
individual bargaining in favor of institutional representation.
For controlling the internal affairs of trade unions, Anglo-American jurisprudence has developed no body of law separate and distinct from that applied
to any other type of voluntary association.2 And the general rule is that voluntary non-profit associations are self-governing organizations whose private
affairs are not subject to judicial review.3 In taking this position, the courts have
stressed certain similarities between social and labor organizations, while they
have ignored significant functional differences, as well as the quasi-public nature of unions.4 Thus the bulk of labor unions, being unincorporated, are treated
like churches and lodges, while the occasional incorporated union is subject to
the rules governing any other corporation.5 This approach seems a bit unrealistic
when applied to the settlement of disputes concerning the internal administration by unions of matters like admission to membership, 6 expulsion and other
I Morgan v. Local ii5o, United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, decided Dec. 31, 1946 (Ill. App., ist Dist.) (unreported).
21 Teller, Labor Disputes and Collective Bargaining i59 (194o).
3 Wrightington, Unincorporated Associations and Business Trusts 320 (i923).
4 In contrast to membership in a fraternal order, which can properly be termed a voluntary association,'approximately 6,3oo,ooo workers in the United States in i945 were covered
by closed- or union-shop agreements by which union membership was made a condition of
employment. An estimated 3,9oo,ooo additional employees were covered by maintenance-ofmembership provisions under which continued union membership was obligatory during the
life of the contract. Extent of Collective Bargaining and Union Recognition in 1945, 62
Monthly Lab. Rev. 567, 567-69 (1946).
s Teller, op. cit. supra note 2, at 291.
6Mayer v. Journeymen Stone-cutters' Ass'n, 47 N.J. Eq. 519, 2o Atl. 492 (i89o); Miller v.
Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 394 (S. Ct., 1938). Contra: James v. Marinship Corp.,
25 Cal. 2d 721, 155 P. 2d 329 (1944). For a general discussion see Summers, The Right to
Join a Union, 47 Col. L. Rev. 33 (1947).

